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The Euro Zone Peripheral 
Countries’ Sovereign Debt Crisis: 
Also a Case of Non-Mature 
Democracies? 
 
Summary: The euro zone peripheral countries face a profound sovereign debt
crisis threatening the very existence of the euro as we know it. Therefore, the
study of the various factors contributing to this crisis is of the utmost impor-
tance. Given the set of the twelve initial member States, the euro zone peri-
pheral countries (Portugal, Greece, and Spain) have in common the fact that
they are recent democracies. Independently from other valid approaches to this 
question, the specific contribution of this paper is to focus on the role played by
institutional and political variables in the behavior of fiscal variables. We show
that the behavior of these variables is indeed statistically different from the one 
observed for the other euro zone countries, which are mature democracies.
These outcomes are also in line with what that literature expects from the rela-
tionship between non-mature democracies and the incidence of election year 
budget cycles.
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The euro zone is going through very difficult times. Greece, Ireland, and Portugal 
(GPS) have been intervened by the European Commission, the European Central 
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. These institutions provided them with 
financial assistance in exchange for substantial general government expenditure cuts 
and increased revenues, taxes and otherwise, in order to reduce budget deficits and 
public debt to sustainable levels, as well as deep structural reforms. Furthermore, 
financial markets have shown continual doubts on the ability of Spain to go without a 
similar intervention. More recently, the same doubts began afflicting Italy, forcing a 
government change to a more technocratic-oriented one, as had been the case in 
Greece a short while ago. 
Except for Ireland, those are all southern European countries. On the other 
hand, it is widely agreed that Ireland’s sovereign debt problems arose from a bubble 
burst in its banking sector. In addition, Greece, Portugal and Spain share the impor-
tant characteristic of being recent democracies, which set them apart from the other 
nine initial euro zone member States. In Portugal and Greece, the dictatorships in 
power collapsed in 1974; in Spain, the death of Franco in 1975 opened way to de-
mocracy under the leadership of the new king.   
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To the diverse and complimentary economic literature that provides the theo-
retical foundations to this paper, governments’ actual management of public finances 
is the outcome of a political process between politicians and voters by means of 
which both groups try to improve their welfare. The explanatory factors considered 
by that literature’s numerous contributions fall under diverse categories. For illustra-
tive purposes, we mention the role played by pressure groups, the ideological orienta-
tion of the political parties in government, institutional variables imposed by consti-
tutional rules, the level of political fragmentation, and the role played by political 
budget cycles. For these cycles to happen, the theory requires several prerequisites, 
mainly the country’s degree of economic development and the overall quality of its 
democracy in connection to the transparency of the budgetary process. This factor 
includes the ability of voters to access and decode economic and political informa-
tion in order to restrict the ability of politicians to manipulate fiscal variables for 
electoral purposes. 
The main goal of this paper is to analyze the impact of political and institu-
tional variables on fiscal variables (like total government expenditures, social secu-
rity expenditures, total tax revenues, and the budget surplus) of the GPS, in the con-
text of mature democracies versus non-mature democracies. 
We apply panel data estimation techniques, and we use annual data from the 
initial eleven funding members of the euro zone plus Greece in the period from 1976 
to 2008. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 reviews the abundant related and 
diverse literature on which this paper has its theoretical foundations; Section 2 de-
scribes the model to be tested and the data set used; Section 3 presents and discusses 
the estimated results. Finally, Section 4 draws the conclusions.  
 
1. The Budget as a Political Process 
 
William D. Nordhaus (1975) and Assar Lindbeck (1976) were the first to think about 
the economic implications of elections, giving rise to the so-called opportunistic 
view. In order to boost their probabilities of re-election, incumbents try to stimulate 
economic growth and reduce unemployment in election years at the expense of more 
inflation, hence generating political business cycles. Given that this approach lacked 
empirical and theoretical support (Alberto Alesina and Nouriel Roubini 1992), it was 
later modified by various authors among whom Susanne Lohmann (1998), Kenneth 
Rogoff and Anne Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990), Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini 
(1990, 2002), and Min Shi and Jakob Svensson (2006) into what is currently known 
as political budget cycles. With the same opportunistic goal in sight, before elections 
politicians manipulate the level of fiscal variables directly under their control, such 
as expenditures, and fiscal revenues. Therefore, countries would face expansionary 
fiscal pre-election cycles, and then contractionary post-election fiscal cycles intended 
to correct for the distortions arising from the former. However, the ability to pursue 
political budget cycles in levels might be constrained by institutional factors impos-
ing limits on public finances, like in the value of the deficit and in the stock of debt 
as a proportion to GDP, as in the euro zone. Therefore, manipulation of the composi-
tion of revenues and expenditures, rather than their levels, is another possibility pre- 
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dicted by this literature (Rogoff 1990). Following this hypothesis, incumbents would 
prefer to allocate extra funds to visible expenditures in detriment of less visible ones, 
for instance, more social transfers but less investment (Rober J. Franzese 2002; Allan 
Drazen and Marcela Eslava 2005, 2006; James E. Alt and David Dreyer Lassen 
2006a, 2006b). However, the empirical literature is not conclusive in this respect 
since whilst some authors find evidence supporting political budget cycles, no matter 
the country’s degree of economic development, others do not (Christina Schneider 
2010, p.128). 
The approaches to political budget cycles are adverse selection and moral haz-
ard-based models focusing on three elements: (i) signaling of competence by politi-
cians to voters; (ii) rational expectations formation by voters coupled with incom-
plete information; (iii) strategic behavior on by both politicians and voters. The as-
sumption of incomplete information relates to voters’ and politicians’ ignorance of 
politicians’ actual competence levels, as well as to the hidden efforts they undertake. 
These efforts, leading to lower taxes, higher expenditures and deficits, or to the re-
composition of expenditures, are observable by the public only with a time lag, serve 
to distort voters’ perception of politicians’ competence, favoring their odds of re-
election. The transparency of the budgetary process is a central element to this the-
ory. The ability of the public to access and understand information on the budget in 
due time is crucial to reduce the occurrence of political budget cycles, and might be 
impaired in many ways. The opaqueness of the whole set of rules on how budgets are 
prepared, approved and executed is one such way. Another likely way are all sorts of 
barriers that electors have to overcome to access existing information; for example, 
no full access to the media owing to economic, legal or other types of constraints, or 
then the information provided is intentionally distorted. This latter case includes gov-
ernment decisions leading to the elimination of some expenditure items from the 
government budget by means of transferring them to entities outside the government 
perimeter, or even the manipulation of important statistical data as was apparently 
the case in Greece. Electors’ experience with the actual workings of a democracy 
also impacts upon the transparency of the budgetary process in the sense that the 
more experienced they are, the more difficult it is for politicians to hide and distort 
relevant information (Adi Brender and Drazen 2003, 2005, 2007). Transparency con-
siderations have thus led the literature to think over the effects of recent versus ma-
ture democracies on the incidence of political budget cycles, and the hypothesis 
tested is that in non-mature democracies transparency is low, subjecting the countries 
involved to those cycles (Maria de Los Angeles Gonzalez 2002). Brender and Drazen 
(2003, 2005) conclude that the political budget cycles found by the empirical litera-
ture are due to samples that include both mature and non-mature democracies simply 
because that is a specific attribute of new democracies. Akhmed Akhmedov and 
Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2004) also find strong evidence supporting sizable and short-
lived political budget cycles in the case of the recent Russian democracy, which 
came into existence after the implosion of the communist dictatorship, and conclude 
that their magnitudes decrease with democracy, and transparency. 
The population’s level of education is generally regarded as a proxy for the 
transparency of the budgetary process on the grounds that the higher it is the higher  
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voter’s ability to understand and decode information. That is why the literature refers 
to mature democracies and developed countries’ voters as fiscal conservatives. How-
ever, in the framework of new democracies were by definition electors are politically 
less experienced, the inclusion of education with that purpose in mind is not neces-
sarily a sound choice. In that particular political context, and especially in compara-
tively less developed countries with strong emigration traditions, as is the case with 
the GPS, it is quite possible that education plays a different role on the budget. The 
emulation of consumption patterns prevailing in the more developed euro zone coun-
tries, coupled with fiscal illusion, might play a stronger influence. In fact, when these 
countries were preparing their accession to the euro zone one of the difficulties most 
emphasized by government officials and academics alike was precisely that. If that is 
the case, then the sign of the estimated coefficient on the level of education is re-
versed. 
Alan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard (1981) theorize that population groups 
whose incomes are lower than average favor income redistribution in their favor, 
vote on political parties that respond positively to their preferences and, in the proc-
ess, lead to a deterioration of the fiscal budget unless higher enough taxes are levied 
on other population groups. Elderly population is one such possible group. The influ-
ence played by pressure groups such as trade unions is equally stressed in the eco-
nomic literature by authors such as Mancur Olson (1965), Gary S. Becker (1983), 
and John R. Lott and Lawrence W. Kenny (1999). These perspectives are closely 
related to the so-called partisan approach first introduced by Douglas A. Hibbs 
(1977) who stresses the ideological bias of political parties and governments. The 
idea is that they serve the ideological and economic preferences of their constituen-
cies. Left wing parties and governments favor income redistribution and low unem-
ployment, whereas right wing governments emphasize economic efficiency and low 
inflation. That is, higher expenditures are expected in the first case, resulting in a bias 
towards fiscal deficits. However, the soundness of this approach requires political 
parties whose programs and practices remain static with respect to the usual ideo-
logical tenets, instead of converging to the center of the political spectrum over time. 
Political fragmentation is given much emphasis in the economic literature 
(Alesina and Roberto Perotti 1996; Yianos Kontopoulos and Perotti 1999; Mark 
Hallerberg, Rolf Strauch, and Jürgen von Hagen 2007). In general, it is assumed that 
the higher political fragmentation is, the weaker the government. The expected out-
comes are higher expenditures, lower revenues, and higher fiscal deficits owing to 
the government’s failure to oppose competing groups pressing for budgetary bene-
fits. Under this perspective, the budget becomes a common good with asymmetri-
cally distributed benefits and costs among community members. Roubini and Jeffrey 
Sachs (1989a, 1989b) provide empirical evidence in favor of this hypothesis; how-
ever, Per-Anders Edin and Henry Ohlsson (1991) and Jakob Haan and Jan Egbert 
Sturm (1994) dispute their findings on several grounds. In fact, there is abundant his-
torical evidence showing that coalition governments, and even caretaker or non-party 
governments, are often empowered to provide countries with the political strength 
required to solve their most severe problems. 
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In spite of its intuition, the degree of social inequality is rarely taken into ac-
count by the empirical literature. To the best of our knowledge, Aandrew Berg and 
Sachs (1988) and Jaejoon Woo (2003) are the few examples available. Woo assumes 
that higher Gini coefficients lead to higher deficits on the assumption of underlying 
incentives to undertake populist policies for income redistribution. The sign he ex-
pects for that estimated coefficient is debatable because high social polarization 
means in fact low-income redistribution, therefore lower taxation and social transfers 
than would be required to achieve a more balanced income distribution.  
 
2. Model and Data Set 
 
From the well-known budget constraint of the government, assuming no monetiza-
tion of the budget deficit, we derive the relationship between changes in the period’s 
stock of debt and the budget balance: 
 
∆   =     −      (1)
 
where the symbols stand for:  , time period  ;   , government expenditures;   , gov-
ernment fiscal revenues; and ∆  , change in the period’s government’s stock of debt. 
Thus, government’s debt is a function of its budget balance and, consequently, 
of all factors explaining government’s expenditures and revenues. 
A panel data approach, controlling for countries’ and time fixed effects,
 is 
used to estimate the effects of political and institutional variables on some selected 
fiscal variables. Since the data set includes all the countries, it seems to be preferable 
to employ the fixed effects estimation. Besides, Hausman test (Jerry A. Hausman 
1978) indicates that fixed effects specification is preferable to a random effects 
model. 
The model tested is: 
 
Fi,t = 0 + i + t + 1UDi,t + 2ELDi,t + 3GOVPi,t + 4GOVFi,t + 
       + 5GINIi,t + 6SECEDi,t + 7YELECi,t + 8PYELCi,t + Xi,t + i,t
(2)
      
where   ,  is a fiscal dependent variable in country   in year  . The selected depend-
ent variables are total government expenditures, social security expenditures, total 
tax revenues, and the budget surplus, all in proportion to GDP. All these five vari-
ables are general government’s. Total tax revenues evaluated in this manner turn out 
to be the countries’ effective average tax rate. 
  As regressors, we include the institutional and political variables related to 
the various contributions of the literature reviewed in Section 2, as well as a set of 
control variables.    ,  stands for trade union density measured as net union mem-
bership as a fraction of wage and salary earners.     ,  is the proportion of the coun-
try’s total population aged at least 65 years old.      ,  captures the ideological 
composition of the cabinet, and assumes values from (1) for hegemony of right-wing 
parties, up to (5) for hegemony of social democratic and other left wing parties. 
     ,  is the level of legislative fragmentation; it takes values from (1) for single 
party majority governments, up to (6) for caretaker and non-party governments. 
     ,  is the analogous measure of relative income distribution and social cohesion.  
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      ,  is the level of secondary education, which increases with the values taken 
by that variable, measured as the percentage of the population that finished secon-
dary school. To capture the effect of elections on the selected fiscal variables we in-
clude an indicator,       , , that is computed according to Equation (3) (we follow 
Franzese 2000, p. 63): 
 
 
      ,  =
  −1   +  
 
12   in an election year 
(3)
1−
  −1   +  
 
12   in a year before an election year 
0  in all other years
 
 
where M is the month of the election, d is the day of the election, and D is the num-
ber of days in that month.       ,  takes values between approximately zero (if the 
election takes place on the 1
st of January) and it  increases as the date of the election 
approaches the end of the year (to a maximum of one if the election takes place on 
the last day of December), taking into account the timing of an election. Note that if 
there are elections in two consecutive years, in the first election year both the first 
and the second branch of Equation (3) have positive values, and       ,  can be 
greater than 1. Since this is very unusual (it only happened three times in the entire 
sample), we cap       ,  at one. In order to detect post-election year budget cycles 
or, for that matter, counter budget cycles intended to correct fiscal decisions taken in 
election years, we also include a variable        ,  defined as: 
 
       ,  =       ,     (4)
 
  ,  is a vector of control variables that includes the unemployment rate   , , the de-
gree of openness of the economy       , , and one period lagged general govern-
ment stock of debt in proportion of GDP,      ,   . The unemployment rate, 
which has several advantages over alternatives such the output gap (see Abel L. 
Costa Fernandes and Paulo Mota 2011, p. 632) is included to control for the eco-
nomic cycle. Trade openness is a variable very often present in fiscal policy models 
since early times. A first line of reasoning considers that open economies are exposed 
to world market fluctuations out of their control and, therefore, are subject to in-
creased volatility of the business cycle. A way to manage this higher risk is through 
increased government intervention in the economy with particular emphasis on the 
social sector (see, e.g., Gunnar Myrdal 1960; David Cameron 1978). However, this 
analysis abstracts from the implications of increased international economic integra-
tion, and the progressive dismantling of tariff barriers, which tear down the effec-
tiveness of those attempts to insulate national economies from unfavorable outside 
events. Therefore, these other circumstances could reduce both tax revenues and pub-
lic expenditures as economies become increasingly more open (Raymond Vernon 
1974). Additionally, openness should have a positive effect on economic growth, 
which contributes to the reduction of the debt to GDP ratio (Berg and Krueger 2003).  
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The lagged general government stock of debt to GDP ratio is included to control, for 
governments’ reaction functions to an excessive public debt to GDP ratio in accor-
dance to the fiscal rules imposed by the Maastricht Treaty.    is country  ’s fixed 
effect,    is period t’s fixed effect, and   ,  is a white noise term.  
To differentiate between mature and recent democracies, our countries’ sam-
ple was divided by means of a multiplicative dummy taking the value of one for 
GPS, and zero for non-GPS countries. Then, to differentiate the effects in the five 
states presently in difficulties, we introduce a multiplicative dummy variable, 
      , , taking the value of one for the GPS plus Ireland and Italy, and zero for the 
others. Finally, we exclude the GPS from the sample and re-estimated the model for 
the remaining nine member states, with a multiplicative dummy variable,    , , taking 
the value of one for Italy and Ireland, and zero for the other countries. With this latter 
model estimation, we test the hypothesis that the performance of these two developed 
and mature democracies do not differ significantly from the other seven member 
states with those same characteristics. 
Except for the fiscal variables, data was collected from Comparative Political 
Data Set I (Klaus Armigeon et al. 2010). Data for general government’s total expen-
ditures, fiscal revenues, social security transfers and the budget surplus are from 
OECD Economic Outlook Statistics and Projections. 
The model was estimated for the period 1976-2008 (32 years of observations), 
taking into account the 11 founding euro zone member States
  plus Greece that 
adopted the Euro in 2001. The choice of the initial year is explained by the fact that 
by then all the countries had become democracies. The panel is unbalanced due to 
missing observations. 
The summary descriptive statistics by variable and by country are in Table 1.   
 
3. The Estimated Results 
 
Before estimating Equation (2) we performed panel unit root tests using the Levin, 
Lin Chu test with individual intercept and trend (see Andrew Levin, Chien-Fu Lin, 
and Chia-Shang James Chu 2002). We consider all the series that exhibit a contin-
uum set of values. The statistics of the tests are -7.087, -7.106, -6.655 and -7.008, 
when we consider respectively total expenditures, social security expenditures, total 
tax revenues and budget surplus, together with the regressors. This means that we 
reject the existence of a common unit root process.  
Tables 2 through 6 report the estimated results. We have first estimated the 
base line model for the 11 initial euro zone member states plus Greece. Then we car-
ried on with our estimates, firstly introducing dummies for the GPS, followed by the 
addition of Italy and Ireland. Secondly, we excluded the GPS from the sample and 
re-estimated the model for the remaining nine member states, with dummies for Italy 
and Ireland.   
In all cases the computed adjusted R
2 show that the model has high explana-
tory power, and provides strong and enlightening results.  
Beginning with the results relative to general government expenditures (see 
Table 2), and taking the base line model first, there are no election or post-election  
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year budget cycles; education and governments’ ideology are not statistically signifi-
cant, but the coefficients on union density and elderly population are positive and 
significant, whereas legislative fragmentation and the      coefficient are signifi-
cantly negative. Except for legislative fragmentation, which has a tightening effect 
upon expenditures, all signs are as expected. In our view, the strong institutional ex-
ternal constraints arising from the Treaty of Maastricht and the Stability and Growth 
Pact justify the effect of fragmentation. The data shows that, for the most part, the 
preparation and actual management of the new currency regime was not the respon-
sibility of single party majority governments. On the other hand, the estimated coef-
ficients on the control variables such as the unemployment rate and the one period 
lagged debt uncover anti-cyclical expenditure policies coupled with a slight effort on 
debt control. 
Once we divide the sample between GPS and non-GPS countries, we find 
some striking differences. For the GPS, governments’ ideology and fragmentation, 
education, and election and post-election year budget cycles are all significantly dif-
ferent from the same variables estimated coefficients for the other nine countries. 
While government ideology plays a restraining role among these, it is just the oppo-
site among the GPS where, except for Portugal, social democratic and other left party 
have prevailed in government. These results confirm the role that the literature has 
come to expect from ideologies in the management of public expenditures. And now, 
even though legislative fragmentation continues to have a tightening effect upon ex-
penditures, it is much weaker than among non-GPS, just −0.17; it sounds as if 
among GPS the external institutional constraints associated with the adoption of the 
euro were less strictly applied. Education is not relevant when it comes to non-GPS 
countries, but it is, and positively so when it comes to the GPS. Finally, in line with 
the literature, the GPS exhibit election year budget cycles reinforced by post-election 
year budget cycles. All considered, these empirical results show that the GPS have 
experienced significantly tough pressures on their public expenditures, different in 
nature from those experienced by their non-GPS counterparts.   
When we add Italy and Ireland to the GPS set and re-estimate the model, the 
empirical results are unmistakably dissimilar, clearly distinguishing between these 
two different sets of countries. Now, governments’ fragmentation, education, elec-
tion-year, and post-election year budget cycles are not statistically different from 
those prevailing in the other seven countries. These results are qualitatively con-
firmed by the regressions reported on Table 6 where we have excluded the GPS and 
divided the remaining sample between Italy and Ireland, on one hand, and the other 
seven developed and democratically mature countries. 
The outcomes on social security transfers on GPS exhibit striking differences 
relative to the rest of the sample (see Table 3). With the exception of union density, 
fragmentation, and the GINI coefficient, all the variables have significantly different 
estimated coefficients. The impact of the elderly population upon the dependent vari-
able is positive, but unsurprisingly lower than among non-GPS. Our explanations for 
this are comparatively lower pensions and survival rates for retired citizens in the 
GPS countries. Government ideology contributes positively to this type of expendi-
tures, that is, social transfers tend to increase as governments’ ideology moves to the  
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left, and vice-versa, precisely what the theory expects; however, it plays no role 
among non-GPS.  
It is as if in developed and mature democracies ideological polarization has 
vanished and its place taken by political competition, that is, non-ideological compe-
tition among political parties shown by a tendency to move towards the center of the 
political spectrum.  
Concerning education, it has a negative influence among non-GPS, but a posi-
tive one among GPS. We rationalize the first of these results on the grounds of the 
positive association between education and personal income. The positive impact of 
this explanatory variable among GPS might be explained on similar grounds: GDP 
growth, which is a variable highly correlated with education, makes it more feasible 
to increase the level of income redistribution. Indeed, on the part of both Greece and 
Spain there were significant income redistribution efforts discernible in their shrink-
ing GINI coefficients. This also applies to Italy and France, but not to Portugal and to 
the other countries in the sample. Besides, and most importantly, in the GPS there are 
election year budget cycles and positive post-election year budget cycles, that is, in-
creased social expenditures on election years are reinforced in the following year. As 
Lunger Schuknecht (2000, p. 118) points out, some expenditure increases are diffi-
cult to reverse once installed. When we add Ireland and Italy, some of the estimated 
coefficients change significantly, most notably those related to political variables. 
The analysis of this dependent variable is complete when we look at Table 6 and see 
that the performance of Italy and Ireland is again no different from that of the other 
seven developed and mature democracies, except for union density. The most impor-
tant result to retain with respect to the control variables is the estimated positive coef-
ficient on the one period lagged debt; it shows that policies undertaken to control 
debt through general expenditures and taxation, as shown in Tables 2 and 4, produce 
socially negative effects demanding higher social expenditures.  
With respect to fiscal revenues (see Table 4), all variables are significantly dif-
ferent among GPS countries in comparison to non-GPS nations, except for post-
election year budget cycles. A result to be emphasized is the non-existence of politi-
cal budget cycles in the developed and mature economies of the sample; moreover, 
post-election year cycles are absent in all cases. Union density and the Gini coeffi-
cient wield a stronger depressing effect upon GPS’s fiscal revenues relative to the 
other countries. Even though elderly population calls for more fiscal revenues, for 
GPS’s it does so for a value that is roughly half the case for non-GPS. Besides, 
among the latter education acts negatively upon taxes, the opposite being true for the 
GPS. Government’s ideology is not statistically significant among non-GPS, but it is 
so among GPS. Once again, ideology plays its classical role in these countries: there, 
left-wing ideologies are more committed to redistribution through taxation, unveiling 
a strong ideological polarization along traditional lines typical of countries with in-
fant democratic regimes. Among the GPS fragmentation concurs in the same positive 
direction validating the results already observed with expenditures, that is: coalition 
governments are not necessarily synonymous with political weakness as claimed by 
Roubini and Sachs (1989a, 1989b). Lastly, GPS experience election year positive 
taxation cycles. Even though tax cycles of this type run against conventional wisdom,  
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they might be explained by three factors: (i) under normal circumstances, fiscal 
measures applying in a particular fiscal year are inscribed in budgets produced and 
approved in the previous fiscal year which, combined with low levels of transpar-
ency, acts to prevent voters to be fully aware of what is going on; (ii) populist elec-
toral campaigns directed at voters with lower than average incomes; (iii) the higher 
share of indirect taxation on fiscal revenues. Again, adding Ireland and Italy to the 
sub-sample brings out some significant qualitative changes, most notably the loss of 
statistical significance of the government fragmentation and election year budget 
cycles. Once more, Table 6 shows that in this respect Italy’s and Ireland’s perform-
ance is not statistically different from those pertaining to the other seven developed 
and mature democracies. 
Let us now address the variable budget surplus. The results are reported in Ta-
ble 5. Some of the tensions uncovered on GPS either on expenditures or on taxes do 
not show up in the budget surplus, such being the cases with ideology, union density, 
elderly and education whose estimated coefficients are not statistically different from 
non-GPS member states. Besides the specific negative impacts upon the budget bal-
ance arising from the Gini coefficient, by far the most remarkable and influential 
results on the GPS are found on the negative and statistically significant estimated 
coefficients for political budget cycles and post-election year cycles, all of which are 
absent among non-GPS. Hence, not only political budget cycles do prevail as they 
are reinforced in the following year in a very significant manner, instead of being 
reversed through post-election cycles. That is, there is no budget consolidation in the 
year following elections. This is not difficult to understand if we bear in mind that 
winning political parties need to fulfill their promises made during electoral cam-
paigns, for the sake of their own credibility, coupled with the difficulty to reverse 
expenditures when in the form of entitlements. Consequently, budgetary problems in 
these countries show a strong and distinct tendency to worsen in a snowball effect. 
On the other hand, the influence played by political fragmentation on the budget bal-
ance is positive, even though much smaller than among non-GPS countries. Once 
again, Table 5 completely differentiates between the cases of GPS, on one hand, and 
Italy’s and Ireland’s on the other. Finally, on what accounts the control variables, 
countercyclical policies are unveiled in spite of the asymmetrical nature of fiscal pol-
icy, as well as a significant effort to control governments’ debt.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The empirical tests just reported unveil strong and illuminating facts about GPS’s 
management of the critical fiscal variables. The behavior of the institutional and, 
most especially, political variables is indeed statistically different from the one ex-
hibited by the other countries. Government ideology has the typical influence ex-
pected by the literature along the spectrum from right to left. On the other hand, the 
attainment of higher education levels by a population long repressed by previous dic-
tatorships in their ability to follow other countries’ consumption patterns has pressed 
for high government expenditures, as opposed to the conservative fiscal preferences 
exhibited by the more developed and mature countries. Besides, and contrary to the 
point of view expressed by Roubini and Sachs (1989a, 1989b), our results prove that  
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legislative fragmentation is not necessarily synonymous with weak governments; 
indeed, circumstances understood as national emergencies may lead to the formation 
of coalitions, and even of caretaker governments, in order to accomplish such vital 
national goals. On the budget balance, even though some of the tensions subjecting 
GPS expenditures are compensated on the revenue side, as it is the case with gov-
ernments’ ideology, the same is not true with the role played by the GINI coefficient 
and, most importantly, by electoral year budget cycles and post-election year effects, 
all contributing to the deterioration of that balance. These latter effects are strong and 
cumulative, and quite distinct from non-GPS since they are non-existent there. Ac-
cordingly, these tests confirm some predictions from the economic literature, espe-
cially that political budget cycles are specific to non-mature democracies and devel-
oping countries.   
In view of the information we were able to collect by means of these tests, it is 
only reasonable to say that GPS’s present crisis was not a surprise. In spite of their 
present difficulties, Italy and Ireland are undoubtedly in the group of the developed 
and mature democracies, rather than in the GPS group, lending empirical support to 
the idea that their problems are mainly caused by different factors.  
Also, in light of the empirical results presented by this paper, it seems correct 
to conclude that the way governments manage public finances in response to institu-
tional and political variables appears to have a strong impact upon the accumulation 
of debt, without excluding other possible and powerful causes which, however, are 
not the concern of this research.   
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Table 1   Summary Statistics of the Fiscal Dependent Variables 
 
  A B Fi Fr G Gr Ir It L N P S 
General government 
expenditures 
Mean 
Std dev 
Variation 1976-2008 
50.4 
4.5 
4.1% 
52.1 
4.7 
-0.7% 
46.7 
8.8 
23% 
51.3 
2.7 
18.9 
46.1 
2.9 
-9.6 
38.3 
8.0 
75.6% 
43.6 
7.5 
-13.0%
46.4 
6.3 
27.3% 
39.6 
1.7 
-0.1% 
51.2 
5.2 
-11.4%
41.1 
4.7 
54.1% 
37.2 
7.0 
50.5% 
General government tax 
revenues 
Mean 
Std dev 
Variation 1976-2008 
39.6 
3.4 
17.5% 
41.3 
4.1 
11.6% 
39.9 
5.2 
6.8% 
40.2 
4.0 
15.8% 
25.3 
1.6 
3.3% 
25.7 
5.2 
48.3% 
31.1 
2.8 
-11.4%
34.4 
7.0 
64.1% 
34.7 
4.7 
16.2% 
40.3 
3.3 
-7.6% 
26.3 
6.7 
70.3% 
25.8 
7.6 
79.1% 
General government  
social transfers 
Mean 
Std dev 
Variation 1976-2008 
17.3 
2.3 
14.9% 
12.8 
1.9  
0.6% 
13.8 
4.9 
32.4% 
17.0 
1.0 
1.2% 
16.5 
20.1 
-2.9% 
12.7 
3.4 
59.5% 
11.3 
3.1 
-3.3% 
15.2 
1.7 
11.8%  
16.7 
3.6 
-51.0% 
19.3 
6.6 
-124% 
10.5 
3.5 
25.7%  
13.0 
2.9 
10.5  
General government  
surplus 
Mean 
Std dev 
Variation 1976-2008 
-0.2 
1.5 
151.4%
0.9 
3.9 
169.7%
2.2 
3.7 
-45.4%
-0.5 
1.1 
-142% 
-0.2 
1.9 
-207% 
-0.9 
2.8 
711.9%
-0.2 
4.0 
-109.9 
-1.1 
3.9 
142.1% 
1.0 
2.1 
161.1%
0.4 
1.9 
404.2%
-0.6 
2.2 
114.3% 
-1.0 
2.5 
-195.1 
          ,  
Mean 
Std dev 
Variation 1976-2008 
49.9 
10.6 
-45.9%
50.9 
4.6 
-0.6% 
67.4 
11.4 
6.9% 
14.3 
5.6 
-62.6% 
30.7 
4.8 
-42.9%
32.9 
6.0 
-35.8%
53.8 
9.0 
-44.5%
39.1 
6.8 
-33.3% 
45.8 
3.2 
-15.3%
29.5 
6.4 
43.0% 
34.0 
16.9 
70.2% 
16.1 
8.3 
67.6% 
         ,  
Mean 
Std dev 
Variation 1976-2008 
15.0 
0.8 
14.7% 
14.9 
1.5 
22.9% 
12.6 
2.5 
52.3% 
14.3 
1.4 
22.8% 
15.6 
2.1 
39.5% 
13.9 
2.6 
49.2% 
11.1 
0.2 
0.9% 
14.7 
3.1 
69.2% 
13.4 
0.7 
6.1% 
12.2 
1.5 
36.7% 
13.7 
2.9 
52.6% 
13.0 
2.8 
53.7% 
     ,   Mode  3 3 3 1 1 5 1 3 3 1 1 5 
     ,   Mode  2 2 3 3 2 1 2 3 2 2 1 4 
     ,  
Mean 
Std dev 
Variation 1976-2008 
42.9 
4.2 
13.7% 
35.7 
6.9 
13.2% 
42.9 
5.7 
23.2% 
42.7 
4.5 
-4.9% 
46.5 
4.6 
21.9% 
44.9 
3.6 
-9.9% 
44.4 
3.0 
16.3% 
45.5 
3.7 
-7.0% 
36.5 
4.4 
12.3% 
41.1 
2.3 
7.3% 
53.0 
4.3 
24.1% 
39.8 
4.3 
-19.5% 
      ,  
Mean 
Std dev 
Variation 1976-2008 
31.1 
7.7 
64.2% 
23.9 
7.8 
87.0% 
17.1 
5.7 
5.3% 
19.4 
12.1 
376.9% 
21.9 
15.1 
506.7%
25.1 
3.0 
87.5% 
25.3 
40.5 
48.0% 
18.8 
8.5 
195.0% 
22.7 
5.7 
80.4% 
28.8 
10.4 
65.6% 
7.7 
3.8 
218.4% 
13.3 
5.9 
178.5% 
     ,  
Mean 
Std dev 
Variation 1976-2008 
50.8 
19.4 
152.4&
100.0 
28.1 
64.0& 
34.5 
20.1 
411.3%
48.3 
17.1 
158.5% 
43.5 
17.3 
176.4%
60.9 
40.3 
448.9%
69.2 
25.9 
-23.7%
92.9 
28.0 
39.3% 
8.8 
2.7 
203.7%
70.5 
13.7 
27.5% 
68.3 
4.2 
9.2% 
57.6 
11.0 
-3.5% 
  ,  
Mean 
Std dev 
Variation 1976-2008 
4.2 
0.5 
-5.0% 
7.7 
2.3 
-2.8% 
6.9 
4.0 
42.2% 
9.0 
1.7 
59.2% 
8.3 
1.5 
73.8% 
8.7 
1.7 
10.0% 
10.5 
5.1 
-54.7%
9.1 
1.5 
-9.5% 
3.0 
1.0 
44.1% 
5.4 
2.0 
69.6% 
6.4 
1.6 
-6.1% 
13.2 
3.2 
90.0% 
      ,  
Mean 
Std dev 
Variation 1976-2008 
71.7
15.5 
73.6% 
128.3
25.0 
59.2% 
57.9
10.4 
67.2% 
42.6 
8.5 
40.1% 
51.0
13.7 
111.7%
44.4
10.0 
40.7% 
114.0
33.0 
62.7% 
41.7
8.0 
36.8% 
201.9
43.6 
83.1% 
107.3
16.0 
47.4% 
58.2 
9.39 
82.1% 
37.7 
13.3 
96.8% 
 
Note: A-Austria; B-Belgium; Fi-Finland; Fr-France; G-Germany; Gr-Greece; Ir-Ireland; It-Italy; L-Luxembourg;  
N-Netherlands; P-Portugal; S-Spain. 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
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Table 2   Estimation Results – Fiscal Dependent Variable: General Government Expenditures 
 
 
 
(I)  
Baseline 
(II)  
GPS countries 
(V) 
GPS plus Ireland and Italy 
Variables  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Variables Coefficient t-statistic 
    41.84*** 5.39 40.78*** 4.80     29.35*** 3.95 
   1.30*** 11.23  1.34*** 12.79    1.19*** 10.95 
         -0.04* -1.79  -0.04* -1.77          -0.03 -1.37 
       -0.07** -2.40  -0.06** -2.07        -0.08** -2.48 
    0.13** 2.19  0.10 1.24     0.32*** 5.27 
     0.69** 2.13  0.86*** 2.68      1.54*** 3.18 
      -0.23 -1.53  -0.35** -2.36       -0.41*** -2.63 
      -0.87*** -3.42  -1.29*** -3.69       -1.17*** -3.81 
      -0.23*** -7.01  -0.22*** -6.86       -0.25*** -6.10 
       -0.02 -0.47  -0.04 -0.72        0.05 1.36 
       -0.21 -0.31  -0.11 -0.16        -0.42 -0.72 
       0.66 1.39  0.66 1.16        0.65** 1.30 
   ∗         -0.10  -0.46     ∗       -0.38*** -5.94 
    ∗         -0.31  -0.74      ∗       -1.41*** -4.68 
     ∗         0.57***  2.73       ∗       0.49* 1.71 
     ∗         1.12**  2.40       ∗       0.44 1.29 
     ∗         -0.11  -0.67       ∗       0.28* 1.62 
      ∗         0.68**  2.29        ∗       0.09 0.544 
      ∗         0.27* 1.71        ∗       0.67 0.54 
      ∗         0.25* 1.69        ∗       0.33 0.23 
OBS / countries  230 / 12  230 / 12  230 / 12 
Time / country 
Fixed effects  Yes / Yes  Yes / Yes  Yes / Yes 
Adjusted R 
Squared  0.90 0.90  0.91 
DW 0.55 0.61  0.61 
F statistic  29.45  26.00  28.29 
 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. ⁺t-statistics based on White cross-section 
consistent standard errors. 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
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Table 3   Estimation Results – Fiscal Dependent Variable: General Government Social Transfers 
 
 
 
(I)  
Baseline 
(II)  
GPS countries 
(III) 
GPS plus Ireland and Italy 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Variables Coefficient  t-statistic 
    6.43 0.91  6.88 0.95     -8.07 -1.61 
   0.71*** 8.76  0.71***  11.11    0.77*** 11.11 
         0.02 1.60  0.03** 2.32          0.05*** 3.52 
       0.02 0.64  0.02 0.90        -0.02 -1.05 
    -0.14*** -2.93  -0.21*** -3.07     0.24** 2.21 
     1.24*** 3.69  1.62*** 3.84      1.80*** 3.42 
      -0.02 -0.23  -0.13 -1.34       -0.07 -0.47 
      -0.57*** -2.99  -0.72*** -2.61       -0.28 -0.92 
      -0.13*** -5.36  -0.14*** -5.36       0.02 0.40 
       -0.13*** -4.19  -0.20*** -5.31        0.02 0.44 
       -0.01 -0.02  0.09  0.14        0.13 0.22 
       0.22 0.42  -0.11  -0.17        0.32 0.60 
   ∗         -0.10  -0.65     ∗       -0.70*** -8.60 
    ∗         -1.39***  -3.42      ∗       -1.87*** -4.56 
     ∗         0.47***  2.86       ∗       0.30 1.26 
     ∗         0.43  1.15       ∗       -0.01 -0.03 
     ∗         -0.12  -1.09       ∗       -0.31*** -2.85 
      ∗         0.77**  2.77        ∗       0.52*** 5.54 
      ∗         0.57*  1.65        ∗       -0.25 -0.38 
      ∗         0.67*  1.66        ∗       0.31 0.36 
OBS / countries  230 – 12  230 - 12  230 – 12 
Time / country 
Fixed effects  Yes / Yes  Yes / Yes  Yes / Yes 
Adjusted R 
Squared  0.73 0.74  0.84 
DW 0.24  0.28  0.37 
F statistic  8.83  7.95  13.91 
 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. ⁺t-statistics based on White cross-section 
consistent standard errors. 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
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Table 4   Estimation Results – Fiscal Dependent Variable: General Government Tax Revenues 
 
 
 
(I)  
Baseline 
(II)  
GPS countries 
(III) 
GPS plus Ireland and Italy 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Variables Coefficient  t-statistic 
    34.86*** 9.69 34.72***  10.21     33.04*** 8.87 
   0.28*** 3.51  0.35*** 4.75    0.35*** 4.82 
         0.03** 2.31  0.03** 2.24          0.03** 2.39 
       -0.03** -2.09  -0.03* -1.78        -0.04** -2.37 
    -0.03 -0.74  -0.09** -2.08     0.15* 1.98 
     1.03*** 4.40  1.23*** 4.80      0.23 0.69 
      -0.01 -0.11  -0.11 -1.24       -0.06 -0.73 
      -0.16 -1.25  -0.26 -1.52       0.02 -0.09 
      -0.10*** -3.74  -0.07*** -2.87       0.001 0.22 
       -0.16*** -5.82  -0.19*** -6.28        -0.07 -1.60 
       -0.37 -0.71  -0.30 -0.55        -0.46 -0.91 
       -0.51 -1.21  -0.54 -1.18        -0.76 1.67 
   ∗         -0.27**  -2.33     ∗       -0.17** -2.26 
    ∗         -0.65**  -2.27      ∗       0.42* 1.74 
     ∗         0.49***  3.94       ∗       0.40** 2.56 
     ∗         0.47*  1.78       ∗       -0.16 -0.60 
     ∗         -0.41***  -4.85       ∗       -0.17** -2.11 
      ∗         1.01***  5.95        ∗       0.25*** 3.24 
      ∗         0.77*  1.8        ∗       0.36 0.57 
      ∗         0.82  1.31        ∗       0.79 1.03 
OBS / countries  230 – 12  230 – 12  230 / 12 
Time / country 
Fixed effects  Yes / Yes  Yes / Yes  Yes / Yes 
Adjusted R 
Squared  0.92 0.93  0.93 
DW 0.47 0.54  0.60 
F statistic  36.25  35.01  38.82 
 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. ⁺t-statistics based on White cross-section con-
sistent standard errors. 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
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Table 5   Estimation Results – Fiscal Dependent Variable: General Government Surplus 
 
 
 
(I)  
Baseline 
(II)  
GPS countries 
(III) 
GPS plus Ireland and Italy 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Variables Coefficient  t-statistic 
    5.96 1.16  8.16 1.45     12.01** 2.24 
   -0.78*** -10.1  -0.76*** -8.53    -0.74*** -8.38 
         0.12*** 6.96  0.12*** 6.62          0.12*** 6.6 
       0.02 1.21  0.02 0.94        0.03* 1.73 
    -0.10 -1.60  -0.14** -1.98     -0.20** -2.55 
     -0.34 -1.29  -0.27 -0.89      -0.95*** -3.84 
      0.30*** 2.67  0.28*** 2.82       0.24** 2.26 
      0.56*** 3.20  0.84*** 3.40       1.07*** 3.21 
      0.16*** 4.76  0.18*** 6.15       0.17*** 5.26 
       -0.05 -1.22  -0.08 -1.60        -0.10** -1.82 
       0.003 0.01  0.002  0.003        0.06 0.11 
       -0.79* -1.79  -0.68 -1.55        -1.04*** -2.87 
   ∗         0.08  0.404     ∗       0.27** 2.28 
    ∗         -0.39  -0.63      ∗       0.63* 1.92 
     ∗         -0.003  -0.01       ∗       0.22 0.81 
     ∗         -0.51*  -1.83       ∗       -0.69* -1.84 
     ∗         -0.34**  -2.40       ∗       -0.14 -0.94 
      ∗         -0.01  -0.03        ∗       0.19 1.14 
      ∗         -0.23*  1.70        ∗       -0.21 -0.22 
      ∗         -0.40*  1.90        ∗       0.47 0.53 
OBS / countries  230 – 12  230 - 12  230 – 12 
Time / country 
Fixed effects  Yes / Yes  Yes / Yes  Yes / Yes 
Adjusted R 
Squared  0.72 0.74  0.76 
DW 0.80  0.87  0.88 
F statistic  8.70  8.00  8.68 
 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. ⁺t-statistics based on White cross-section con-
sistent standard errors. 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
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Table 6   Estimates for Ireland and Italy in the Context of the Nine Developed and Mature  
Democracies Eurozone Founding Countries 
 
 (I)   
Expenditures 
(II)  
Tax revenues 
(III) 
Social transfers 
(IV) 
Surplus 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
    26.89*** 3.75 31.68*** 8.31 -7.37 -1.32 13.36** 2.5 
   1.28*** 11.13 0.28*** 3.53 0.80*** 10.62 -0.80*** -10.74 
         -0.03 -1.16 0.03** 2.45 0.05*** 3.45 0.11*** 6.55 
       -0.06* -1.76 -0.03 -0.18 -0.03 -1.36 0.03* 1.94 
    0.27*** 5.37 0.08 1.24 0.23*** 3.17 -0.14* -2.02 
     1.44*** 3.39 0.60** 2.21 1.45*** 3.82 -1.12*** -3.80 
      -0.24* -1.67 0.01 0.09 0.11 1.01 0.31*** 2.86 
      -0.57** -2.06 -0.07 -0.29 -0.46* -1.91 0.40** 2.41 
      -0.25*** -6.96 -0.07*** -2.78 0.003 0.11 0.15*** 4.03 
       0.04 1.37 -0.12*** -3.27 0.02 00.051 -0.08 -1.60 
       -0.37 -0.61 -0.50 -0.99 -0.10 -0.19 0.03 0.06 
       0.64 1.39 -0.73 -1.56 0.26 0.53 -1.09*** -2.91 
   ∗     -0.42*** -2.68 -0.11 -0.83 -0.75*** -7.77 0.17 0.88 
    ∗     -2.95* -1.7 -1.02 -0.96 -1.60 -1.26 1.57 1.08 
     ∗     0.24 0.37 0.45 1.16 0.21 0.53 0.02 0.07 
     ∗     -0.38 -1.00 -0.05 -1.16 -0.12 -0.34 0.20 0.64 
     ∗     0.69*** 2.88 0.27* 1.80 -0.21 -1.29 0.16 0.95 
      ∗     0.51 0.72 0.60 1.22 0.38 0.77 -0.24 -0.36 
      ∗     1.22 0.79 0.71 0.83 -0.08 -0.10 -0.13 -0.11 
      ∗     0.46 0.28 0.87 1.07 0.36 0.35 0.96 00.81 
OBS / countries  204 - 9  204 - 9  204 – 99  204 -9 
Time / country 
Fixed effects  Yes / Yes  Yes / Yes  Yes / Yes  Yes / Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.92  0.93  0.783  0.76 
DW 0.65  0.60 0.37  0.93 
F statistic  29.95  36.34  13.10  8.86 
 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. ⁺t-statistics based on White cross-section 
consistent standard errors. 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 